Poke Stateful Firewalls, Suricata, Zeek & OT Conduits
Craft sessions that actually survive stateful TCP tracking, or intentionally inject Xmas scans, fragments, and rogue SQL/Modbus writes to prove your sensors are awake.
- Stateful firewalls and Suricata (
flow:established,to_server;) silently drop lone spoofed L7 packets — give them a 3-line->/<-handshake first. - Or go full gremlin: override
seq,acknum, Xmas flags (fin psh urg), or IPv4 fragments (mf,fragoffset) to verify your scrubbers actually block garbage. - Test Purdue Level 1–3 OT rules (
modbus,dnp3CRC-16,s7comm,opcua) in a.pcapinstead of gambling with a live plant PLC.
1. Why Lone Spoofed Packets Get Ghosted by Suricata & NGFWs
Modern firewalls (Palo Alto, FortiGate, Check Point, Firepower) and IDS engines (Suricata, Zeek) track full TCP streams. Fire a naked TLS ClientHello or HTTP POST with no prior SYN -> SYN-ACK -> ACK and the sensor shrugs and drops it as mid-stream noise, leaving you wondering why your shiny new detection rule never fired.
Three handshake lines in .frasm open the flow cleanly, and your L7 payload rides in on the exact expected seq and acknum so flow:established rules evaluate every byte.
// Test Suricata tls.sni Shadow-IT rule on TCP 443// Run: suricata -r suricata_tls_sni_check.pcap -l ./logshost workstation { ip 10.10.20.45 }host shadow_saas { ip 198.51.100.77 }compile { workstation -> shadow_saas tcp syn srcport 53110 dstport 443 win 65535 mss 1460 sackperm wait 1ms workstation <- shadow_saas tcp syn ack win 65535 mss 1460 sackperm wait 1ms workstation -> shadow_saas tcp ack wait 1ms workstation -> shadow_saas tls clienthello handshakeversion 0x0303 sni "unapproved-upload.example.net" alpn "h2" wait 2ms workstation <- shadow_saas tls alert}# Compile and feed straight into Suricata + Zeek offline mode (zero root!)
frameassembly suricata_tls_sni_check.frasm
suricata -r suricata_tls_sni_check.pcap -l ./suricata-out
zeek -C -r suricata_tls_sni_check.pcap2. Intentional Chaos: Out-of-State ACKs, Xmas Scans & IPv4 Fragments
Half of security testing is proving bad packets get *dropped*. Whenever you explicitly specify fin psh urg, custom seq / acknum overrides, or IPv4 fragmentation flags (ipid, mf, fragoffset), FrameAssembly puts your exact bogus flags on the wire while keeping IP/TCP checksums valid so the NIC doesn’t eat the frame before the firewall sees it.
host red_scanner { ip 203.0.113.99 }host dmz_bastion { ip 192.0.2.25 }compile { // 1. Out-of-state ACK probe -> expect RST or silent drop red_scanner -> dmz_bastion tcp ack srcport 44900 dstport 22 seq 9000 acknum 1 win 1024 wait 5ms red_scanner <- dmz_bastion tcp rst seq 1 wait 10ms // 2. Classic TCP Xmas tree packet (FIN + PSH + URG) -> HTTPS 443 red_scanner -> dmz_bastion tcp fin psh urg srcport 44901 dstport 443 seq 1000 urgent 0 wait 10ms // 3. Two-piece IPv4 UDP fragment pair (mf -> fragoffset 1) red_scanner -> dmz_bastion udp srcport 44902 dstport 161 ipid 0x3344 mf fragoffset 0 payload "AAAAAAAA" wait 1ms red_scanner -> dmz_bastion udp srcport 44902 dstport 161 ipid 0x3344 fragoffset 1 payload "BBBBBBBB"}3. OT / ICS Conduit Checks Without Brick-Risking a Live PLC
Poking a live turbine or water-plant PLC just to verify Claroty, Dragos, Nozomi, or an industrial firewall blocks Function Code 6 writes is a career-limiting move. Build authentic modbus, dnp3 (with real IEEE 1815 per-chunk CRC-16), s7comm, bacnet, ethernetip, and opcua traces in user space instead:
// Prove OT firewall allows FC 03 (Read) <-> alerts on FC 06 (Write)host eng_ws { ip 172.16.30.15 }host plc_01 { ip 172.16.10.50 }compile { eng_ws -> plc_01 tcp syn srcport 50900 dstport 502 win 64240 mss 1460 vlan 30 wait 1ms eng_ws <- plc_01 tcp syn ack win 64240 mss 1460 vlan 30 wait 1ms eng_ws -> plc_01 tcp ack vlan 30 wait 1ms // Allowed: Read Holding Registers (FC 03) eng_ws -> plc_01 modbus txid 1 unitid 1 readholdingregisters addr 40001 count 2 vlan 30 wait 3ms eng_ws <- plc_01 modbus txid 1 unitid 1 readholdingregisters isresponse value 1500 vlan 30 wait 5ms // Unauthorized: Write Single Register (FC 06) -> should fire conduit alert! eng_ws -> plc_01 modbus txid 2 unitid 1 writesingleregister addr 40001 value 9999 vlan 30}